Notes on Aristotle De Anima 3.5 by Rist, John M.
Binghamton University
The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
12-29-1963
Notes on Aristotle De Anima 3.5
John M. Rist
University College, Toronto, johnmrist@yahoo.co.uk
Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp
Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient
Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more
information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rist, John M., "Notes on Aristotle De Anima 3.5" (1963). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 444.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/444
r 
NOTES ON DE ANIMA. 3.5. 
F', ·--� '\)·,.\\ . \ 
;·- \ . I 'I ', 1 • (, t 
Of all the Aristotelian doctrines perhaps the most difficult is that concerning 
the Active and Passive Intellects which we find in the short fifth chapter of the third 
book of the De Anima. Interpretations of this chapter have be.en almost as numerous as 
interpreters, and it would be naive to expect at this stage to be definitive. Neverthe-
less it seems that progress has been delayed in many cases by a too casual approach to 
what Aristotle says in the chapter �tself - and this at least admits of some improvement. 
The chapter opens with a comparison between the soul and the world of nature. 
Just as in the whole of nature, says Aristotle, there are two distinct things, matter 
which is potentially all things, and an efficient cause which makes all things, so 
A A 
distinct elements must exist en te psyche. Our first problem is the meaning of this 
A 
en te psyche. Does it mean "in the case of soul" or 11in each individual soul11? It is 
1 
perhaps facile of Ross to say that en t� psyche "can hardly mean only 'in the case of 
2 
the soul111, even if this is in fact correct, without offering some reason for his 
decision. Rather he might have argued from the text of line 22. Here Aristotle speaks 
of t�e Active Intellect when it is separated ( ch8ristheis ). The use of the aorist 
participle ( taken with the word chGristos which, as we shall see, must have the sense of 
"separable" in line 17 ) implies a time when the Active Intellect is not separate from 
the Passive. There must therefore be a time when the Active and Passive Intellects are 
united in some wa;y. That Theophrastus assumed the existence of such a time is shown by-
.A 3 
his remark Mikton gar p8s ho nous ek te tou poietikou kai tou dynamei. Now if the 
Active Intellect is at some time at least not separated from the Passive, it is clear 
that it cannot be -wholly transcendent. 
May we say, however, that although the Active Intellect is not entirely 
transcendent, it is to be regarded as a single Intellect immanent in a number of human 
souls during their lifetime? Aristotle compares the Active Intellect to art which has 
( "" ;._ /\ I\ ) an effect on matter hoion he techne pros ten hylen pepontren. Must we assume from this 
that it is Art ( with a capital A) which affects matter? Of course this is not the 
Aristotelian view. As we know from the Metaphysics ( 1071A20 - 22 ), Man is the father 
/ 
'' ,: ''.'_) 
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of Man, but there is no such existent as Man. Rather we should say that Peleus is the 
father of Achilles. Similarly Art is not the efficient cause of the sculpting of a 
block of marble into the form of a statue. The cause is rather the particular form of 
the statue in the mind of the sculptor who is the efficient cause of the product. Thus 
if we are to put any weight at all upon Aristotle's comparison of the Active and PasE-1i ve 
Intellects to Art and its material, we must say that it is not Active Intellect, but a 
particular Active Intellect, that is the element in the soul which nmakes all things", 
just as it is the particular art of the particular sculptor which causes the production 
of the statue. Aristotle then means by his phrase en t� psyc� "inside the individual 
soul11• Every soul therefore contains its own individual Active and Passive Intellect. 
The interpretations of this passage which spring from the minds of Alexander of 
4 
Aphrodisias and Averroes must be rejected. 
Our interpretation, however, is apparently in accordance with that of 
Theophrastus (�. Them. in de Anima 108. 25 - 28 Heinze), who, after wondering whether 
the Active Intellect is symphytos or whether it has a genesis, decides in favour of the 
former alternative (eoike d1oun hds agencitos). The Active Intellect is agenetos and 
imm.3.nent (enyparchbn). We should note also the language which Theophrastus employs to 
describe it. It is ho kin'?m as well as ho poi�tikos - and the genuinely Aristotelian 
5 
nature of this terminology has been demonstrated by Barbotin. The fact that the Active 
Intellect is a "moving" cause brings it into line with Aristotle's general theories of 
movement and activity, as we shall see below. 
There is no need at this stage of the discussion to invoke the famous text of 
the De Generatione Animalium about the �-s thyrathen, as so many of the commentators 
have done. This mistake derives from Alexander and still recurc? frequently. J. A. 
6 
Philip, for example, writes: "The phrase ho thyrathen nous serves as a hint or aid to 
7 
the understanding of what Aristotle meant by the nous poietikos.11 Barbotin, however, 
rightly connects Aristotle' s leipetai de ton nou�__!££�on thyrathen epei si.enai with a 
passage of Theophrastus quoted by Simplicius. The passage runs hai men orexeis kai 
A A A �ithymiai kai orgai somatikai kineseis eisi kai apo toutou ten archen echousin, hosai de 
- 3 -
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kriseis kai thebriai, tautas ouk estin eis heteron anagagein, all' en aute te psyche 
(this too seems an echo of De Anima 3.5) kai he arche kai h� energeia kai to telos, ei ge 
� 
de kai ho nous kreitton te kai theioteron, hate de exothen epeision kai panteleios. That 
this is an echo of the doctrine of the De Generatione Animalium, if not of the treatise 
itself, seems certain, but there is no reason to claim that it refers to the Active 
Intellect. Both the De Generatione Animalium and Theophrastus refer to nous as a whole; 
to both the distinction between Active a.nd Passive Intellect is irrelevant. There will 
therefore be no further discussion here of the nous thyrathen. 
We may say then that there are within each individual soul an Active and a 
Passive Intellect. The Active Intellect is the moving factor and the Passive the factor 
that is moved. We may perhaps compare the doctrine of the Physics that all souls, and 
indeed everything in motion, require an efficient as well as a material cause. 11If then 
everything that is in motion must be moved by something, and that something must either 
be moved in its turn by something else or not, and in the latter case it is the true 
agent and we need go no further, but in the other case we must run it back until we do 
reach a primary mover not moved by- something else • • •  then it follows that if everything 
that is in motion is moved by some agent, and if the primary agent itself is in motion but 
is not moved by anything else, it must be moved by itself (256Al4 - 22).11 Aristotle then 
of course goes on to demonstrate that the first mover is not in fact self-moved but un-
moved, but this does not concern us here. We are simply concerned to recognize that the 
individual �' not being an unmoved mover, must itself be moved in some such way by an 
efficient cause. Furthermore, as we know, the efficient cause is present in the nous 
itself; it is in fact the Active Intellect. 
II 
After determining that the Active Intellect is present in the soul, we must next 
consider the nature of its activity. Aristotle tells us that it functions 11by making all 
things". We must therefore unravel the meaning of this phrase. In his book on Aristotle, 
Ross held that the function of the Active Intellect is to bring the Passive Intellect up 
from potentiality to actuality by making it actually know its objects. · So far so good, 
- 4 ··· ·· 
8 
but he then supposes that for this to be possible, the Active Intellect must be "something 
in us that actually knows already, some element that is cut off from our ordinary con-
sciousness so that we are not aware of (its) pre-existing knowledge11• This suggestion 
about the pre-existing knowledge of the Active Intellect will require further investiga-
tion later. Ross, however, himself offers a different view in his recent Commentary on 
9 
. 
the De Anima. Here he suggests that the Active Intellect is the faculty by which we (1) 
form general conceptions (2) grasp universal truths, and (3) from two universal truths 
10 
infer a third. As Philip has pointed out, this view is different from any of the 
interpretations of the Active Intellect offered by the commentators. furthermore, as he 
goes on to show, it does considerable violence to the De Anima itself. Yet Ross himself 
has indicated (p.45) that there are two suggestions in De Anima 3.5 itself which show how 
Aristotle must have understood the Active Intellect: the first is the comparison with 
art which does not make it products out of nothing; the second is that with light which 
raises potential colours to the status of actual colours. We know in general that 
Aristotle believes that nothing can be created out of nothing. We can be certain there­
fore that t8i poiein panta cannot simply mean 11by making all things". It must mean "by 
11 
making things of one kind into things of another". That is, the Active Intellect must 
work upon some "material" and must transform this 11material11• What is this material? We 
know that it is in the soul. What else, we may ask, than the Passive Intellect? 
Although Ross points to the help the comparisons of the Active Intellect with 
art and with light can give, he is now unwilling to make use of them. With his account 
of the function of the Active Intellect in mind, we Ehould not now be s urprised at his 
denying (p.43) that the Active Intellect acts on the Passive Intellect at all; rather, he 
thinks, it is concerned with the ap prehension of a different class of objects. This 
theory is supported by a curious argument. Aristotle says, according to Ross, "not that 
the one Reason acts on the other, but that the one makes all things (although on Ross's 
interpretation it could in fact only make a limited number of "logical" or "mathematical" 
things) and the other becomes all things. This is certainly what Aristotle says, but the 
real point is that all things are 1 made11 in the soul.· All the objects of thought are 
- 5 -
11made11 into characteristics of the Passive Intellect which thus "is made" or "becomes" al.1 
things. Thus when one thought gives way to the next, the Passive Intellect, now "made" of 
one kind of thought, is made into another. This is the only way in which it could in 
fact "become all things11. In rejecting such an interpretation, Ross is simply despising 
what little help Aristotle himself gives us. He is in fact exaggerating his earlier 
12 
statement that "the analogy with light must not be pressed too closely". Rather it seems 
that neither this analogy nor the comparison with art should be used at all! 
Ross's recent interpretation of the Active Intellect must therefore be denied 
on the grounds that it flies in the face of what little evidence we have. We must revert 
to something like the view that he adopted in his Aristotle and recognize, with the 
De Anima itself, that the Active Intellect has the function of bringing potential 
knowledge in the Passive Intellect into actuality, just as light turns potential colours 
into actual colours and art transforms the block of marble into the statue. Active 
Intellect transforms the nous poi�tikos into a nous noon. 'rhus far at least the inter-
pretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias must be pronounced correct. 
The Active Intellect, we see, is an efficient cause which acts upon the Passive 
Intellect in the act of thinking. Since efficient causes are themselves in act, as we 
read in the Metaphysics (1049B24) as well as in the De Anima itself (417Al7 - 18), we 
must consider the nature of the activity of the Active Intellect. Since the Active 
Intellect is the efficient cause of thought, are we to suppose that as Peleus, a man in 
act, is the father of Achilles, so the Active Intellect, if it is to cause thought, must 
itself have thought: 
We should realize from the start that the comparison of the Intellects 11vd.th 
Peleus and Achilles must be misleading. Peleus is external to Achilles, but the Active 
I\ 
Intellect and the nous noon are both in the soul. The efficient cause of thought in the 
soul is not comparable to Peleus, but to that inherited power of development handed on by 
Peleus to Achilles himself. After Achilles is born, his efficient cause is in himself. 
We may in a sense say that it is in act, since it is effective, but the immanent efficient 
cause in Achilles is not in actuality a man. No more need the Active Intellect be 
- 6 -· 
possessed of any knowledge of the external world - for if it were, it would be identical 
with its objects and thus also pathetikos - nor need it have any such pre-existing know-
ledge of which we ourselves are unaware, as Ross suggests. The efficient cause in 
Achilles is not a man in actuality, but a power that is capable of making Achilles, now a 
boy, into a man. Similarly there is no need for the Active Intellect to be possessed of 
actual knowledge, at any rate of the external world; rather it is the power which enables 
such knowledge to be abstracted by the Passive Intellect. 
This rather strange nature of the Active Intellect explains very well the 
apparent confusion of terminology which Aristotle uses to describe it. It also explain s , 
as we shall see, why the comparison of the Active Intellect wit h  light is so peculiarly 
apt. In line 15, the Active Intellect is described as hexis tis, while in line 18 it is 
an energeia. Commentators have found this puzzling. Hicks, after noting that in a 
13 
number of passages hexis is practically a synonym for eidos, writes: 11That which is 
always actual and never potential can only be described as a hexis by a stretch of the 
term. Hence tis.11 But the Active Intellect is an unusual kind of energeia in any case. 
Again it seems comparable to the power to stimulate growth inherent in Achilles. This 
power might reasonably be called a kind of 1 1positive quality" ( the phrase is Hicks' ) or 
an actuality. Peleus, of course, could only be described as an actuality, not as a kind 
of disposition. Hexis is thus also particularly appropriate to an efficient cause in the 
soul, rather than external to it. Most interesting still is the fact that light itself, 
to which the Active Intellect is compared, is one of the activities which can at times be 
called a hexis. At De Anima 3.5.15 it is given as an example of a hexis, yet below it 
acts as an efficient cause and we would suppose it to be an activity. Indeed elsewhere 
this is almost always what it is. At De Anima �.18B9 and 419All it is an energeia tou 
diaphanous. Yet at 418Bl9 it is by implication a hexis. The truth of the matter is that 
Aristotle's terminology of ,·,potentiality", 11actuality", "disposition", is sometimes 
insufficiently precise to achieve an exact description of the phenomena with which he is 
concerned. 




mysterious hex.is is very strange and cannot be acceptable as an interpretation of 
Aristotle. Alexander's view is that the Active Intellect is the cause of the Passive 
Intellect's becoming a nous en hexei. It has been suggested that the only reasonable 
/\ 
explanation of this is that when he says einai tina dei kai poietikon noun, hos aitios 
14 
t�s hexe�s t�s tou hylikou nou ginetai, he is reading a text of Aristotle different from 
our own, for in De Anima 3.5 as we have it we must certainly follow the general opinion 
of modern scholars that the Active Intellect is not the cause of some kind of hexis but 
that it is such a hex.is itself. Mr. F. H. Sandbach, however, has suggested to me an 
explanation which accounts for the difficulty of Alexander's interpretation very well, 
namely that he understood h�s hexis tis (j) in line 15. It is certain that Aristotle 
did not intend this sense, but had he done so I do not believe that it would have been 
impossible for him to omit the 5. If Alexander took him this way, we can indeed accuse 
him of being perverse, but not of being a fool, for if such a reading of Aristotle could 
be understood, the Alexandrist doctrine would readily follow. 
Now that we see what kind of hexis - energeia the Active Intellect is, we 
should realize that there is no need to suppose that it has some kind of pre-existing 
knowledge of the external world of whose existence we are unaware. 'rhe power of grol.Arth 
in Achilles is not identical with Achilles the man, nor is it any kind of potentiality 
of Achilles the man; rather it is the power which produces Achilles the man. \rfo might 
call it poi�tikon. Sirrdlarly light is not identical with the colours which it produces, 
nor is it any kind of 11pre-colour11 in the ordinary sense of 11colour"; rather it is, as we 
shall see, the colour of the transparent, which must make it different from ordinary 
colours. Similarly the Active Intellect does not possess ordinary knowledge ( and thus is 
not any thought which is formally identical with the external. object of thought ) either in 
a form of which we are conscious or in any other form; rather it is the power which 
/\ enables the Passive Intellect to become a nous noon by being made identical with the 
intelligible Forms of the objects of thought. 
We can perhaps understand this power a little better by pushing the comparison 
with light ( as light is understood by Aristotle ) a little further. Light is not one of 
the colours it brings up from potentiality to actuality, but it is in a sense analogous 
to them. It is a colour sui generis; to phos hoion chr8ma esti tou diaphanous (De Anima 
418Bll). Similarly perhaps the Active Intellect will not have knowledge, pre-existing or 
otherwise, of the same kind as that which it helps to produce in the Passive Intellect, 
but another knowledge of a unique kind, which could therefore only be knowledge of itself, 
since all other knowledge could potentially be obtainable by the Passive Intellect. But 
we shall return to this later. 
III 
/\ /'\ 
In line 17 Aristotle describes the Active Intellect as choristos kai apathes 
A � 
kai amiges; in line 22 he speaks of a time when it is choristheis. Following Zeller, 
Hicks remarks that 11ch8ristos means here not merely 'separable' but 'actually separate' 
i.e. 'not involved in physical life'." He thinks it is best explained by De Generatione 
Animalium 736B28 where bodily activities are said to have nothing to do with the activity 
/I 
of� (cf. De An. 408B29, 413A4 - 8), and remarks that "the three predicates choristos, 
th!\ • I\ apa es, arruges were applied to� in III c, 4 before any mention had been made of the 
distinction between active and passive intellect". He believes that in chapter four 
these epithets are applied primarily to the Passive Intellect and that they must now be 
applied a fortiori to the Active. 
.A 
• And, he holds, in chapter four choristos means 
"actually separate 11• 
Let us first look at whether we can derive much help for chapter five from 
chapter four. In chapter four there is no doubt that Aristotle is teaching that � 
must be wholly free from association with the body. 
/\ 
That is the sense he gives to anuges 
j'.. 
( e,g.429Al8, 24- 25). Choristos too then must, as Hicks says, mean ''actually separate" at 
429All, separate, that is, from the body-soul complex. But what relevance has this for 
our ch�ristos in chapter five line seventeen? Is Aristotle there speaking of the 
relation of nous in general or even of the Passive Intellect to the body? 
As a preliminary to the solution of this problem, we must compare ch�ristos 
I\ 
with the choristheis of line 22. Most recent writers on this chapter of the De Anima 
have assumed that the "WOrds ch�ri stheis d 1 esti monon touth' hoper esti (11. 22 - 23) 
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For Aristotle to be able to say "having been separated" implies that he supposes there is 
a time when the Active Intellect is not 11separated11• That he thinks of the separation as 
taking place at death is shown by the irnrnediate raising of the question of immortality. 
Since then there is a time when the Active Intellect is not separated but linked in some 
way to the Passive, as efficient cause to matter, and since, however, separation does 
occur at death, then during a man's lifetime his Active Intellect must not be separated 
but separable. 
IV 
In his edition of the De Anima Ross brackets out to d'auto (1.19) •.• ou noei 
21 
(1.22); in his German translation Theiler 
/\ 
omits to d'auto • • •  oude chronoi. Ross suggests 
that since these words ( as far as oude chron8i ) recur in chapter seven - where, as Hr. 
/\ 
Sandbach reminded me, they are also preceded by hyles - and are more appropriate there, 
they should be excised here. He adds that they disturb the continuity of lines 17 -· 19 
with 22 - 25. The latter argument is subjective and could not be accepted as adequate by 
itself. As we shall see, the words all' ouk hote men noei hote d'ou noei deleted by Ross 
but retained by Theiler are necessary for an understanding of the last phrase of the 
chapter. And even if this were not so, it would seem that Theiler is the more moderate 
in retaining these words which do not occur again in chapter seven, while still deleting 
/\ 
the passage from to d'auto to oude chronoi. Assuming therefore that there is no 
satisfactory reason for deleting as much as Ross desires, let us consider the validity of 
the decision to remove simply the passage that is repeated in chapter seven. 
There would seem to be a clear case for deletion only if these words upset the 
sense of chapter five. Let us consider the idea that in the individual potential kno�� 
ledge is prior to actual knowledge, though in general this is not so. How does this idea 
square with the follo'Wing suggestion that the Active Intellect always noei? Now we know 
already that the Active Intellect is in the soul of the individual and is distinct in 
22 
each individual. We know too that it is in act and that it is a hexis tis, like l ight. 
Since this is so, the potential knowledge that is prior in the individual cannot be the 
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knowledge of itself, if it is continually conscious of itself and intuits itself in an 
eternal present without memory of the past or imagination of the future. Thus the Active 
Intellect which thinks continually and cannot kno w the external world must be thinking 




itself. In this respect it is comparable with God who is noesis noeseos in the 
27 
Ivietaphysics (1074B33). Scarcely anyone nowadays is disposed to take seriously the 
identification of the Active Intellect with God made by Alexander of Aphrodisias� but we 
can at least learn to see how such an identification might have seemed plausible. We 
have demonstrated here certain features of the Active Intellect akin to those of God, but 
although to move from similarity to identity would be rash, yet at lea.st a recognition 
that the highest aspect of the human mind can have no knowledge of the external world may 
help us to understand why the God of the Metaphysics a fortiori cannot have such know-
ledge. This God is said to be very good (1072B30) and to think what is best (1074B33). 
Clearly the best must be more akin to the Active than to the Passive Intellect of man, 
and clearly the thought of God must be more akin to the thought of that Active Intellect. 
Thus if the Active Intellect has no memory and no knowledge of the external world, we 
should not be surprised that Aristotle refuses to attribute such memory and knowledge to 
God. Perhaps we may sa3r that Aristotle envisages both God and the Active Intellect as 
the power of thought understood as thought of itself. 
VI 
Yet in this discussion of the nature of the Active Intellect by it self is not a 
fundamental difficulty being neglected? vJe. have seen already that the Active Intellect 
is during our lifetime 11in the soul11 and that it acts as a necessary efficient cause of 
thought. Yet since the soul is a unity an.ct exists as a unity, how can Aristotle hold 
that some part of it ( i.e. the Active Intellect ) can exist separately after death? The 
human soul for Aristotle is the form of the human body; form and matter cannot exist 
apart except in the minds of philosophers, that is, as abstractions. If soul by itself 
is an abstraction, how can a mere part of that soul, the Active Inte,llect, be anything 
-- l/: ... 
more than an abstraction? Yet clearly for Aristotle it is much more than an 
28 
abstraction. There is no easy solution to this problem. All we can do here is indicate 
that this difficulty about the Active Intellect is merely an extreme example of a 
. 
difficulty about the Aristotelian fonn in general. The problem has been explained in the 
29 
clearest possible terras by Gilson. Gilson imagines Plato living long enough to read the 
first book of Aristotle's Metaphysics and then writing a dialogue entitled Aristoteles 
to refute the novelties of his pupil. In this supposed dialogue Socrates is made to sayj 
"Then, my lad, I wish you could tell me how it may be that beings are, through sharing in 
an essence, which itself is not." The difficulty is simply that while Aristotle usually 
regards synola ( individuals ) as the only realities, he also identifies ousia with essence 
in the Metaphysics. Essence is the cause of the existence of individuals, but essence by 
itself does not exist. And yet sometimes it does seem to exist apart - at least in the 
case of God. But not only in the case of God does this difficulty arise. We can now ::3ee 
that the Active Int ellects, identical but distinct in individual men, exhibit the same 
confusion. The soul is the form of the body; the Active Intellect is in the soul during 
our mortal life; the form cannot exist with out the matt er. 
If any real consistency is to be preserved for the doctrine of the De Anima,, we 
30 
cannot but follow the advice of Philip, who remarks: 111 can see no grounds for ref1rning 
to concede that in stud;}ring and describing the human soul Aristotle recognized in it some 
faculty or capacity or element not explainable as part of the bod;y-soul complex • . . 11 It 
is certainly true that in De Ahima J.5 the Active Intellect does not seem to be explain-
able as part of such a complex; yet we must not forget that in general Aristotle holds 
that it is by the possession of the power of reason that man is differentiated from the 
animals. And he is not merely thinking of the possession of such a power, but of its use; 
31 
that is, he regards nous noon as an essential aspect of the form of man. We are bac.k 
again to the problem of whether and in what way form in general can exist apart. The 
De Anima merely exhibits in an extreme manner the difficulties in the whole Aristotelian 
doctrine of the reality or unreality of essence. The soul is not only a form, but, as we 
I\ /\ I\ 
know from 412B 10 - 11, an ousia he kata ton logon. touto de to ti en einai toi. toioidi 
- 15 -
/\ 
somati. In view of this, it seems no easier to understand how the human mind, and 
a fortiori the Active Intellect, is not a part of the body-soul complex than it is to 
believe that there can be wholly immaterial substances. And yet for Aristotle there is 
at least one such substance. 
VII 
We must turn to the last phrase of the chapter, where the text reads kai aneu 
32 
toutou outhen noei. Of this Ross 1-'JTote as follows: "The last words of the chapter are 
capable of a variety of interpretations, viz. 
(1) 'and '\i\iithout the passive reason the active reason knows nothing.' 
(2) 'and without the active reason the passive rea.son knows nothing. ' 
(3) 'and without the passive reason nothing knows. 1 
(4) 'and without the active reason nothing knows. I II 
Without offering any reason for his choice, Ross then approved of number (4). 
It is clear that the problem in this sentence is the reference of toutou. 
Considerations of grammar do not seem adequate to settle the matter one way or the other; 
considerations of doctrine must therefore be invoked. Now we should naturally suppose 
that if nothing rtthinks11 without the Passive Intellect, then the Active Intellect cannot 
think when it is separated from that Passive Intellect. And yet unless we unreasonably 
excise the phrase auk hate men noei hote d1ou noei in line 22, w'e know that the Active 
Intellect does not merely think intermittently. Hence it would seem absurd to suppo�:;e 
33 
that aneu t.outou means "without the Passive Intellect". Zeller, however, who is 
34 
followed on this point by Rodier, and whose argument in itself is accepted as reasonable 
35 
by Hicks, denies the contradiction. His argument is that the phrase ouk hote men noei 
hote d'ou noei does not apply to the thought of the individual, whereas it is such 
thought that is under discussion in aneu toutou·outhen noei. Zeller's contention that 
the earlier passage does not deal with individuals depends on a comparison of these words 
I\ 
with the section to d1auto • • •  oude chronoi immediately preceding them. Of course if this 
section is to be deleted (as is the view of Ross and Theiler) half our difficulties are 
- 16 -
solved, but the case for deletion is, as we have seen, insufficiently strong for us to 
neglect Zeller rs argument. Assuming then that we accept the full text, are we to agree 
that Zeller's suggestion is valid? 
/\ /', 
Are we to say that since in general actual episteme 
is prior to potential, but that this is not so in the individual, the words all' ouk 
hote • • •  noei, with their suggestion that the Active Intellect must qua active be in 
continuous thought, cannot apply to the Active Intellect in any individual soul, but must 
refer to the Active Intellect in general? 
We are in no way bound to accept such reasoning. In the first place we must 
consider the Active Intellects VJithin each individual soul. They cannot, as we have seen, 
be merely potential. What in that case would bring them up to actuality? Another Active 
Intellect? Such a regress is impossible. The Passive Intellect? That is absurd. They 
are in fact already t� ousiai. on energeia. It should thus be clear that the words 
/\ 
to d 'auto.. • oude chronoi are not to be taken in the manner favoured by Zeller. We cannot 
deduce from them that the Active Intellect in the individual has potential epist�m� before 
it has actual. Suc h  a situation turns out to be absurd. Besides, the very use of the 
term epist�m� should indicate that the words to d'auto . • •  oude chron8i do not concern the 
Active Intellect at all, and should not therefore be used as a guide to all' ouk . . , noei. 
Episteme, as we know well from the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere is 
not th e same as � ·  The truth of the matter may b e  - and this is perhaps the best 
/\ 
reason for retaining the words to d'auto . • .  oude chronoi - that while in the individual 
/\ /\ 
potent ial episteme is prior in time to actual, the Active Intellect on the contrary does 
/\ 
not experience the movement from potential to actual �sis but rather is continually in 
act. Thus Aristotle by the whole passage to d1auto . • .  ou noei is further emphasizing the 
uniqueness of the operation of the Active Intellect. This being so, Zeller's attempt to 
· persuade us that aneu toutou can refer to the Passive Intellect without Aristotle 1 s 
contradicting what he has just said must be accounted. a failure. We are bound therefore 
to translate aneu toutou as "without the Active Intellect". 
Thus of Ross's four alternatives as translations for the last phrase of De Anima 
3.5 we can eliminate two. The words must either mean "and vtlthout the Active Intellect 
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act. It is itself in a rather peculiar kind of act. As for immortality, this is 
limited to the Active Intellect, which certainly survives, though it has no memory and 
no knowledge of the external world. Its strange character may perhaps best be 
summarized as a power to induce thought which is itself some kind of self-thinking 
being. If this much is clear about the nature and function of the Active Intellect, 
37 
the nature and function of the Passive Intellect becomes easier to understand. 
John Ivi. Rist 
University College, Toronto. 
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µ Q~cvµ dcµ ¡cµ /µ
 
$,*µ ccµ ¡µ tX§cµ cµ v_cXµ oµ ¡tcµ _u¡v^¡vµ ]c¡«ccµ ^sv¡µ X`µ ^sv¡tcvµ

¬tcµ tcµ ¬v¡c=µ ''!µ vµ _c¨cµ u¡caccµ vµ ^tv¡µ wµ v^~puXµ ^cµ v_vc_c²Xµ
_uµ _uu¡¡µ cµ u]uu¡ _vµ cXX²ucµ cµ ^µ dXX³vcµ _vµ oX¡¡µ c~µ ccvc´Xµ
¨u¤¡Yµ bcµ ¤µ
$<µ Uµ  Pµ ccµ ¡cµ <	µ /9µ
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 µ ?µ **µ
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?^¡u¨cµ K¡c~c^¡
µ ]¤¡µ ¡µ ¡tcµ @^¡x¨cµ K¡c~c^¡µ uµ qecX~
µ ccµ ]c~«µ
*-µ Pµ Gµ Iu^{µ ccµ ¡cµ 

  µ ?µ *0µ c®~Xvµ ¬t°µ ?u¡¡~c
µ ¬sµ _cµ ¡µ Xq¥fµ
¡tcµ oX^¡µ sccµ s~_µ ¡tX¡µ ¡scµ NXv¨cµ L¡c~~c^¢µ vµ cvtX]~cµ Stcµ OXv¨cµ
K¡c~~c^¡µ tXµ cµ ¡c¡vX~v¡°µ nµ ¤]¡X^cµ uµ v¡
µ X_µ ¡tvqµ nµ ¡tvµ |v_µ ^Xµ
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()cc]c%&µ uµ ~uocµ Xµ oX^¡µ «sv^tµ ¬cµ c¨cµ |c«µ Stcµ cc®v¡vqµ A^¡v¨cµ K¡i~~c^¡
µ
u^cµ u£µ uµ uXv©c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X|c_µ ¡sX¡µ c°µ uµ Xµ Xonc^¡uµ oµ ¡sX¡µ ¬tu^tµ
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_cX¡tµ oµ ¡tcµ ]_°µ c°µ ^c[c µ B¡µ /.#A*-µ  */µ t«c§cµ scµ tXµ ¡µ c^uou^X~~°µ
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cc]c
µ tcµ c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thus destroyed), then memory perishes with us. 
I am tempted to suppose that the words 11We do not remember", followed by 11this (the 
Active Intellect) is impassive" contributed to Alexander's positing a common Active 
Intellect for all of us. 
27. A similar comparison is made by Mansion (see note 16) 470, who however compares 
not the Active Intellect but the "pure essence of Intellect". 
28. Although in this paper we are discussing the problem of the Active Intellect only, 
it should be observed that � as a whole is held by Aristotle in a number of 
I\ 
passages (apart from De. An. 3.4 where it is choristos) to be some sort of entity 
in its own. right. It "seems" to be an ousia in its own right and to be imperishable 
at De An. 408Bl9 - 20. At 413A6 - 7 there are some parts of the soul �mich are not 
entelechies of the body. Nous comes from outside at De Gen Anim. 736B27 ff. and 
744B21 ff. The possibility of its survival occurs again at Met. 1070A24. It goes 
without saying that all this is difficult to square with the perishability of the 
Passive Intellect in De Anima 3.5. 
29. E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto 1952) 49 - 50. 
JO. J. Philip (see note 6) 201. 
31. Cf. A. Mansion (see note 16) 466. 
32. W. D. Ross (see note 1) 152. 






11Ame II (Paris 1900) 467. Traite de 
R. D. Hicks (see note 11 )  509. 
R. D. Hicks (see note 11) 510. 
101, note 3. 
37. I should like to thank those persons who read an earlier draft of this paper, and 
in particular Mr. F. H. Sandbach, without whose comments it would never have 
realized its present form. 
